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Abstract: 
The public goods game examines how people make decisions about contributing money 
for group welfare. In the experiment, participants receive a number of tokens with a monetary 
value and choose how many to contribute to a public fund. The public fund tokens are increased 
in value and are divided equally amongst group members, and each participant individually 
receives the value of their own tokens that are not contributed.  Therefore, participants have an 
incentive not to contribute to the public fund, even while they wish that other group members 
contribute generously. 
This public goods experiment studied how changing endowments, between a low and 
high number of tokens, affected individual contributions levels. Each group member received an 
endowment of 10 tokens in one game and an endowment of 50 tokens in the other game. It was 
hypothesized that there would be a difference in the proportion of the endowment contributed to 
the public fund between the high and low endowment level, with the low endowment of 10 
tokens resulting in a higher proportional contribution rate than the high endowment of 50 tokens. 
It was found that there was a statistically significant difference in contribution rate by 
endowment level, with the 10 token endowment yielding higher proportional contribution rates. 
This experiment is significant because it examines how people’s propensity to give changes with 
changing asset levels.  
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1 Introduction 
This study investigates how people’s propensity to give is affected by asset levels by 
varying the endowment levels in a public goods game. The public goods game is an experiment 
designed to mimic the decisions that people must make regarding contributions to public welfare 
at personal expense. A public good is a good that benefits everyone but is both non-excludable, 
meaning that even if people do not contribute to the cost of providing the good, they can still 
reap the benefits it provides, and non-rival, meaning that one person’s use of the good does not 
take it away from anyone else. An example of a public good is a public park. There is a cost to 
maintain the park but once this cost is covered, anyone is able to enjoy the park regardless of 
how much or how little they personally paid to maintain it. One additional person being in the 
park does not diminish any other person’s enjoyment of the park, making it non-rival. 
Traditional economic theory of a maximizing rational non-altruistic individual would 
suggest that these goods would be underfunded because people would be unmotivated to 
contribute to the public good when they could still benefit from the goods without paying. People 
only have a certain amount of money that could be contributed, which is considered their 
endowment. The group would benefit the most from having everyone contribute to the public 
good. However, since public goods are non-excludable, each individual would be best off if they 
personally did not contribute but everyone else did. In this case, they would still have access to 
the public good but would not have paid for it. This is known as free-riding, when the individual 
relies on their group members to contribute without reciprocating themselves. Therefore, each 
player has an incentive to keep their entire endowment, so individual interests conflict with the 
group interest (Ledyard 112, 1995). The public goods experiment was designed to test this theory 
and to explore the factors that affect contributions.  
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 The public goods game is set up with small groups of participants who are each given a 
designated number of tokens. These tokens hold a small monetary value. Each round, 
participants anonymously choose a number of tokens to contribute to a public fund. All tokens in 
this public fund are multiplied by a predetermined number and then equally distributed amongst 
participants. Any tokens that are not contributed to the public fund are kept in the private fund 
for that individual player. Those private tokens retain their original value but are not shared with 
other group members. Therefore, each participant earns a total of what he or she retains in the 
private fund in addition to his or her share from the public fund.  
For example, consider a game in which groups of 5 participants each receive 50 tokens, 
which make up their endowment. The tokens are valued at $0.10 in the private fund and are 
worth $0.25 in the public fund, meaning that each participant would receive $0.05 for each token 
contributed to the public fund. If a participant chooses to contribute 20 tokens to the public fund, 
she would keep 30 tokens in her private fund. If the other four group members contributed 
nothing to the public fund, the total public fund would be worth 20 tokens, valued at $5. Each 
participant would receive $1 as their share of the public fund. The participant who had 30 tokens 
remaining in her private fund would get $3 from her private fund. This means her total earnings 
for that round would be $4. Each of the other group members would have $5 from their private 
funds, and they would receive $1 from the public fund, for total earnings of $6 each. The next 
round, the participants would all receive the same number of tokens and make the decision 
regarding how many tokens to contribute to the public fund again. 
The theory of the maximizing rational non-altruistic individual predicts that no 
participants would contribute anything to the public fund, since each token kept in the private 
fund gives that participant a higher payoff than a token that he or she contributes to the public 
 5 
fund. Therefore, if all participants are evaluating how many tokens to contribute on a solely 
rational basis, the public fund should always have zero tokens. Several rounds are played with 
the same conditions, including the same group members, in order to test how participants act 
over time and with experience.  
 Despite the theoretical prediction that participants would not contribute to the public 
fund, historically experiments have found that initially, the majority of participants do contribute. 
At the beginning of the game, participants typically contribute a portion of their tokens, with the 
expectation that others will do the same. However, with repeat trials, this contribution rate tends 
to decline, which suggests that participants learn that they can earn a higher payoff when they 
keep all their tokens in their private fund and let other group members pay into the public fund. 
As some participants contribute less, the overall contributions quickly decline because those who 
are left contributing decide that they do not want to be the only ones paying in to the public fund. 
This change suggests that once a sense of cooperation is broken, or if a sense of cooperation is 
never established, and it is clear that not all participants will contribute to the public fund in 
order to generate group returns, the participants who were still contributing decide that they 
would rather just keep their tokens. This creates a trend towards the predicted result (no 
contributions to the public fund) despite the benefit to all of those contributions.  
 This public goods experiment examined how changing the endowment level affected the 
proportion of the endowment that was contributed to the public fund. Participants played two 
games. In one game they received a low endowment of 10 tokens and in the other game they 
received a high endowment of 50 tokens. The average contribution rates across twelve rounds of 
the game were compared to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in 
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contribution rates between the endowment levels. It is hypothesized that there will be a 
difference in contribution rates by endowment level.  
2 Literature Review 
 The public goods game has been studied in many different forms. Despite the theoretical 
expectations, the literature on public goods experiments reveals that in early stages of the game, 
participants provide somewhere between 30 and 70 percent of their endowments (Ledyard, 1995, 
p. 170). One early study examining public goods looked at conditions that motivated free riding, 
or individuals not contributing to the public good while still reaping the benefits of other group 
members participating. The experiment found that under a wide variety of conditions, free riding 
was lower than expected, with participants contributing approximately 50 percent of their tokens 
(Marwell and Ames, 1980). Because of its stark contrast with the theorized outcome, this 
experiment helped to lay the groundwork for future studies in public goods. Since then, there 
have been many versions of this game used to test how different circumstances affect 
contribution decisions. While there is a substantial range in these variations, this review will 
focus on the study of inequality and changes to participants’ initial endowments. 
 Inequality can have a profound effect on the perceived fairness of the game. If 
participants are aware that they have more money than their group members, it can change how 
they make their decisions regarding contributions. A clear example of this result was found by 
Buckley and Croson (2006) in an examination of differing endowment levels. In this experiment, 
half of the group members received 25 tokens at the beginning of each round while the other half 
received 50 tokens. All participants contributed roughly the same number of tokens to the public 
fund in absolute terms. This means that the high income participants contributed a much lower 
percentage of their endowment (Buckley and Croson, 2006). Since the endowment distribution 
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was explained to all participants before the game began, the high income participants knew that 
they had more control over how many tokens were in the public fund. However, this clearly did 
not translate into a greater sense of responsibility to proportionally increase the total amount in 
the public fund. If these individual contributions are not private, however, then even lower total 
contributions are observed. In conditions of equality (all participants initially receive the same 
number of tokens), slight inequality (all participants receive different endowments but have a 
small range of possible endowments), and high inequality (participants have a wide range of 
possible endowments), participants in both conditions of unequal endowments all contributed 
less when it was known how much the high income participants contributed compared to the low 
income participants (Anderson et al., 2008). This suggests that low income participants behave 
differently when they are aware that they would be contributing a higher percentage of their 
endowment than the high income participants. Creating this impression of unfairness could be 
what prompts overall lower contributions to the public fund. On the other hand, the low 
contribution rates may be dependent on the degree of inequality. Another study with three 
conditions of endowments-- equal, slightly unequal, and strongly unequal-- found that only the 
strongly unequal endowment group had differing percentages of contributions (Keser et al., 
2013). There are some differences found between the groups in which the endowment level is 
only slightly different, so the effect of different endowment levels is still unclear.  
 Additionally, inequality can enhance or negate the effects of other factors on participants’ 
decisions. For example, it was found that working on a task with group members before playing 
the game creates a sense of group identity and promotes higher contributions to the public fund. 
However, if the endowment level of participants differed, meaning that some participants had a 
higher number of tokens than others, the effect of group identity disappeared. In the unequal 
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endowment groups, participants that received a higher initial endowment contributed a lower 
percentage of their tokens despite the impact of group identity (Charness et al., 2014). The high 
endowment participants were less impacted by other factors guiding their decisions.  
These effects are not only seen in the public goods game. It is worth considering the 
impact of a change in endowment in similar games. Two games that involve similar decisions 
about monetary contributions are the ultimatum game and the dictator game. The ultimatum 
game consists of two players: a proposer and a responder. The proposer is given an amount of 
money and must propose a split to the responder. The responder is then able to accept the money 
offered to him or her or to reject it. If the responder rejects the proposed split, then neither player 
receives any money. In the dictator game, one player, the dictator, is able to choose how a given 
amount of money is split. The other player simply receives the amount allocated by the dictator, 
with no ability to reject the money and thereby punish the dictator. A meta-analysis of 31 studies 
of the ultimatum and dictator games compared the relative difference between high and low 
stakes in these games. The high stakes games involve a higher amount of money, which could 
lead to more pressure in making the correct or optimal decision. It was found that the amount of 
money played with didn’t affect the offers made in the ultimatum game. However, as the amount 
increased in the dictator game, the dictator gave continuously lower amounts (Larney et al., 
2019). This could be due to the chance of getting nothing in the ultimatum game, whereas there 
is no such risk in the dictator game.  
While the literature on the public goods game has a great deal detailing the effect of 
differing endowments between group members, little has been said about changing endowment 
levels. Because experimental results have differed from economic theory in many public goods 
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experiments, it is important to test how changes in income compare to theorized outcomes 
(Ledyard, 1995, p. 113).    
Furthermore, public goods often need to be privately funded through charitable giving 
when government funding is insufficient. In order to get these goods funded, it is important to 
understand the conditions that influence peoples’ likelihood of supporting charities and public 
goods when they could easily free ride. Andreoni and Payne (2013) provide a valuable overview 
of the many factors that affect charitable giving. One factor that has been emphasized in 
charitable giving research but needs to be examined for public goods is income level. While the 
likelihood of giving to charities has been found to increase as income increases, available data 
suggest that poorer households that do donate money give at a higher percentage of their income 
than any other income bracket (List, 2011). The following experiment will extend the behavioral 
economics literature on contributions to public goods by endowment level by examining if 
people’s propensity to give stays constant as a percentage of income or stays at relatively similar 
levels of absolute donations. This is significant because it could help elaborate on how changes 
in income impact communities’ ability to fund public goods.  
Based on the existing research, there does seem to be a difference between unequal 
endowments within a group. Therefore, it would be expected that there will also be a difference 
between high and low endowments when all group members have the same endowment. The 
finding that people with lower incomes donate a higher percentage of their income suggests that 
subjects will contribute a higher proportion of their endowment when they have a low 
endowment compared to when they receive a high endowment. It is therefore expected that there 
will be a significant difference in contribution rates to the public fund based on endowment level, 
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with the low 10 token endowment yielding higher contribution rates than the high 50 token 
endowment.  
3 Method 
 This experiment consisted of six sessions with a total of 39 undergraduate student 
participants. Each group playing the games was made up of five subjects. The same five subjects 
remained in a group for both games. Subjects played two games, which each consisted of twelve 
rounds. In one game, the subjects had an endowment of 10 tokens. In the other game, subjects 
received an endowment of 50 tokens. The order in which the two games were played varied 
randomly by experimental session. Twenty subjects played a game with 10 tokens followed by a 
game with 50 tokens. Nineteen subjects played a game with 50 tokens followed by a game with 
10 tokens. In this experiment, tokens were valued at $0.06 each in the private fund. In the public 
fund, the value of each token was increased to $0.15 before being divided equally amongst group 
members. This means that the value of a public fund token to each individual group member was 
$0.03.  
 Before the first game began, subjects received an information sheet establishing their 
consent for the experiment (see Appendices, Research Information Sheet). They next received a 
set of instructions about the game procedure (see Appendices, Instructions for Public Goods 
Experiment). These instructions were read aloud and subjects were able to ask questions at any 
point (see Appendices, Public Goods Experiment Instructor Script). The instructions explained 
the game format, describing how the endowment level would differ between the two games, the 
decision that the participants would make for each round about how many tokens to contribute to 
the public fund, and how the tokens would be valued in both the private and the public fund. An 
example round was shown with five players all contributing different amounts. Each 
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participant’s earnings from the example round were included in the table. Participants were told 
that their contribution decisions would not be observed by their group members, and that after 
each round they would be able to see their own decision as well as the total number of tokens 
contributed to the public fund by the entire group and their individual earnings for the round. 
They also knew that the game would be played online and that they would not be allowed to 
discuss the results from any round until the experiment was complete. Finally, they were told 
that the number of tokens they contributed would only affect that one round, meaning that they 
would restart each round with the same number of tokens. Their endowment did not change due 
to their decision in the previous rounds.  
 The instructions also informed participants about how they would be paid. Each subject 
was paid $5 for participating in the experiment. Additionally, participants were paid for one 
randomly selected round from each game. The purpose of taking one round from each game was 
to guarantee that participants were paid for one round in which they had an endowment of 10 
tokens and one round in which their endowment was 50 tokens. Participants knew that the two 
paid rounds would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment by rolling a 12-sided die. 
This was an integral part of the experiment: if participants knew in advance which rounds they 
would be paid for, there would be no way to ascertain their motivation in the other rounds. Since 
the participants did not know in advance which rounds they would be paid for, it can be assumed 
that participants were not choosing how many tokens to contribute to the public fund at random. 
This is a standard practice in the public goods game experiment (Ledyard, 1995).  
 After all of this information was explained, participants had to fill out the highlighted 
boxes in the table at the end of the instructions. This quiz question was created to verify subjects’ 
understanding of the game and the payoffs. Subjects were able to ask questions and use the 
 12 
example round to help them answer these questions. Before beginning the game, all participants 
had to correctly answer these questions.  
 It should be noted that one subject played the game twice, simultaneously participating in 
two groups at once. This was necessary because subjects did not always show up when they were 
scheduled to participate. Despite overbooking experimental sessions, additional participants were 
required during four of the six sessions to maintain groups of five. In one of these sessions, only 
nine participants were present. Rather than turning away four participants, one subject 
participated in both groups. One of the subject’s data points was randomly selected and dropped, 
so that she would only count in the results as one participant. Therefore, despite having eight 
groups of five participate in the experiment, there are only 39 subjects.  
Subjects were given a code to the online platform Vecon Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. This code allowed for all subjects to log into the same group. Subjects submitted 
their decisions regarding how many tokens from their endowment they wanted to invest in the 
public fund. These decisions were selected from a drop down menu ranging from zero to the 
entirety of their endowment. Subjects could choose any integer amount within their endowment 
range. Any tokens they did not invest were kept in their private fund for that round. After all 
group members submitted their decisions, each subject was able to see how many total tokens 
were invested in the public fund, how many tokens they individually chose to invest in the public 
fund, how many tokens they chose to keep in their private fund, and the dollar value of each of 
these contributions. This means that each subject only knew their own decision and the total 
number of tokens contributed by all other group members. As a result, subjects had no way of 
knowing how much any particular group member contributed, or if the same people were 
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contributing from round to round. Each subject’s decisions were therefore anonymous from their 
group members. 
 After twelve rounds, the first game concluded and subjects were reminded that the only 
difference in the next twelve rounds was that their endowment level had changed. After all of the 
24 rounds of the two games had been completed, the participants were thanked for their time and 
their payment was determined.  
4 Results 
4.1 Contribution Rate at Different Endowment Levels 
 To determine if there was a difference between the proportion of the endowment 
contributed to the public fund when participants had an endowment of 10 tokens and when the 
participants had an endowment of 50 tokens, a paired t-test was conducted. A paired t-test was 
used because the two samples were both made up of the same population, being all participants 
in the study. Each participant’s proportion of the endowment contributed to the public fund was 
compared at the two endowment levels. On average, participants contributed 35.0% of their 10 
token endowment and 31.0% of their 50 token endowment (Table 1). The resulting test statistic 
of 1.795 corresponded to a p-value of 0.081. This is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
There is support for the hypothesis that there is a difference in the contribution rate between a 
low and high endowment level. In this experiment, the low endowment level of 10 tokens 
yielded a higher average contribution rate.  
Graph 1 illustrates the proportion of the endowment contributed to the public fund by 
each participant when they had an endowment of 10 tokens compared to their contribution when 
they had an endowment of 50 tokens. The majority of participants contributed a higher 
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proportion when they had an endowment of 10 tokens, as can be seen from the 10 token line 
being higher than the 50 token line, with several exceptions.  
4.2 Contribution Rate at Different Endowment Levels without Last Round 
However, there could be an issue with including the last round of each game in this 
analysis, as participants have less incentive to preserve a relationship with their group members 
at the end of a game. Therefore, another paired t-test was conducted excluding the 12th round of 
each game. The average proportions contributed changed, such that the 10 token endowment 
resulted in a 34.6% contribution rate and the 50 token endowment resulted in a 31.1% 
contribution rate (Table 1). The test statistic is 1.697, resulting in a p-value of 0.098. This 
difference is still statistically significant at the 10% level.  
4.3 Contribution Rate at Different Endowment Levels without First or Last Round 
Additionally, the first round of the game could be attributed to learning and deciding on a 
strategy. For that reason, another paired t-test was conducted excluding both the 12th and the first 
round. The average proportion of the endowment contributed over 10 rounds for the 10 token 
endowment decreased to 34.5% while the 50 token endowment stayed the same at a 31.1% 
contribution rate (Table 1). The contribution rate is still higher in the 10 token endowment 
condition, but the resulting test statistic is 1.500, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.142. By 
excluding both the first and the 12th round, there is no longer a statistically significant difference 
in the average proportion of the endowment contributed to the public fund between the 10 token 
and the 50 token endowments.  
4.4 Contribution Rate by Game Order 
 In order to verify that this effect was not the result of game order, additional tests were 
conducted. A paired t-test was used to determine if the first game had a different average 
 15 
contribution rate than the second game, regardless of endowment amount. In the first game, there 
was an average contribution rate of 33.8%. In the second game, the average contribution rate was 
32.2% (Table 1). The test statistic of 0.712 provided a p-value of 0.481. This means that there is 
no evidence that there is a difference in the average proportion of the endowment contributed to 
the public fund by game order. This is important because it suggests that the difference in 
contribution rates by endowment level is likely not the result of differences in the first and 
second games.  
4.5 Contribution Rate by Initial Endowment Level 
However, there could be a difference based not on the first and the second game, but on 
which endowment level was received first. In other words, people may contribute a different 
proportion if they received a 10 token endowment followed by a 50 token endowment compared 
to people who received a 50 token endowment first and a 10 token endowment second. To 
address this possibility, two independent t-tests were conducted. The first compared the average 
proportion of the endowment contributed from the 10 token endowment between participants 
who received the 10 token endowment first and participants who received the 50 token 
endowment first. An independent t-test was used because the 39 participants were no longer 
being compared at two separate points. Instead, 20 participants who had an initial endowment of 
10 tokens were compared to 19 participants who had an initial endowment of 50 tokens. Those 
with an initial endowment of 10 tokens had an average contribution rate of 34.0% during the 10 
token endowment game. Participants with an initial endowment of 50 tokens had an average 
contribution rate of 36.1% during the 10 token endowment game. The resulting test statistic of 
0.295 yielded a p-value of 0.770 (Table 1).  
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The second independent t-test compared the average proportion of the endowment 
contributed during the 50 token endowment game between those with an initial endowment of 10 
tokens and those with an initial endowment of 50 tokens. The 20 participants who received an 
initial endowment of 10 tokens contributed an average of 28.5% of their endowment during the 
50 token game. The 19 participants who received an initial endowment of 50 tokens contributed 
an average of 33.6% of their endowment during the 50 token game. This gave a test statistic of 
0.711, which corresponded to a p-value of 0.482 (Table 1). Neither of these comparisons were 
statistically significant. This means that there is no evidence of a difference in contribution rate 
based on which endowment amount was received first.  
4.6 Contribution Strategies 
One interesting aspect of this game is the difference in contribution strategies used by 
participants and how these strategies varied by endowment. The strategies were evaluated in both 
games, which resulted in a total of 78 games examined for contribution strategy. These 78 
contribution strategies were sorted into 7 categories. An example of each of these strategies is 
shown in graph 2. Altruistic players contributed 80% or more of their endowment in all twelve 
rounds. Rational maximizers had the opposite contribution strategy, in which players never 
contributed more than 30% of their endowment. Imperfect maximizers never contributed more 
than 60% of their endowment.  
There were also players who ranged in contribution rates from 0 to 100% of their 
endowment. Some of these players rotated each round between lower and higher contribution 
rates, which is classified as mixed strategy cyclical. There were also midrange contributors, who 
contributed 50% of their endowment with slight variation on both sides. Maximizers with 
altruistic bursts contributed 50% or less of their endowment with no more than three rounds 
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going above 50% contribution rates. This can be seen with the example game in graph 2. This 
participant contributed nothing to the public fund for nine rounds, but then had one round in 
which they contributed 70% of their endowment and two rounds in which they contributed their 
entire endowment. The exact opposite of this strategy was the altruistic with maximizing bursts. 
Participants adopting this strategy contributed 50% of their endowment or more in at least nine 
of the twelve rounds. In the example game, this participant only contributed less than 50% in one 
round.  
5 Discussion 
 These results indicate that there is a difference in the proportion of the endowment 
contributed to the public fund based on the endowment level. This supports the experimental 
hypothesis. On average, participants contributed significantly higher proportions of their tokens 
when they had an endowment of 10 tokens compared to when they had an endowment of 50 
tokens. This difference was statistically significant when all twelve rounds of the games were 
compared as well as when the last round of each game was removed. However, the difference in 
contribution rates was no longer significant when both the first and the last round of each game 
was removed. Overall, these results suggest that participants are willing to contribution a higher 
proportion of their endowment when they have a lower endowment and that they contribute less 
to the public good when they have a higher endowment.  
There is no evidence that this difference in proportional contribution rate by endowment 
level was dependent on which endowment level was received in the first game. The first game 
contribution rates were not significantly different from the second game contribution rates 
regardless of endowment level. Additionally, there was no significant difference in contribution 
rate in the 10 token endowment game between participants who received a 10 token endowment 
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in the first game and those who received a 50 token endowment in the first game. The same 
result of no significant difference was found when examining the contribution rate in the 50 
token game between participants who had an initial endowment of 10 tokens and those who had 
an initial endowment of 50 tokens. The fact that there was no significant difference in any of 
these comparisons means that the difference found in the contribution rates of the high and low 
endowments are likely not a result of which endowment level came first. It appears that 
participants did not simply change their behavior between the first and second game due to 
factors other than the endowment level.  
The contribution strategies provided further insight into differences and similarities 
between the games. The majority of participants kept the same strategy for both games. 
However, there was variation in the strategies adopted by people based on initial token 
endowment. Graph 3 shows the number of players that used each strategy based on initial 
endowment amount. Graph 4 shows the number of players that used each strategy based on token 
endowment. It is clear that there are both certain strategies that were employed more often as 
well as strategies that were more common based on initial endowment and game endowment 
type. These graphs illustrate that the most common strategies used were rational maximizer and 
imperfect maximizer. On the other hand, only two players, for a total of four games, used the 
altruistic strategy. This is interesting because it means that many players chose to keep the 
majority of their endowment in their private fund.  
There are few differences between graph 3 and graph 4, which means that the variation 
between game strategy doesn’t change when looking at game endowment and initial game 
endowment level. The general patterns are similar. However, there are still differences between 
these graphs. One interesting difference is that all of the maximizers with altruistic bursts had an 
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initial endowment of 50 tokens, but had an even split between games with 10 tokens and games 
with 50 tokens. This is because the same players used this strategy for both games they played. 
This was the case for many players, which resulted in equal numbers of participants choosing a 
strategy when comparing by current game endowment level as opposed to initial game 
endowment level.  
6 Conclusion 
 This public goods game experiment examined how contribution rates change based on 
endowment amount. The results support the hypothesis that people contribute a higher 
proportion of their endowment when they receive a lower endowment. This is expected based on 
the existing literature, which has found that higher endowments don’t lead to higher contribution 
rates. However, this study examined how contribution rates changed when participants went 
from a high to a low endowment level or a low to a high endowment level. This allowed for 
comparison between the same participants with changing endowment levels as opposed to 
comparing participants with unequal endowments within the same group. This was important to 
increase understanding of how public goods are funded and the role of income level. These 
results indicate that, all other things equal, people will contribute a higher proportion of their 
income to goods that benefit the group when they are receiving a lower income. These results 
have policy implications as well, regarding methods of increasing the provision of public goods.  
There were limitations to this experiment. The small sample size limits the significance 
of the results. Additionally, since the subjects were all undergraduate students, it is possible that 
these results will not apply to other populations. Further research should use participants from a 
population that better represents the general population while still examining how different 
endowment levels impact contribution rates. Another limitation is that the high endowment is 
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only five times larger than the low endowment. The major income inequality in the United States 
means that those with a high income have far more than five times the income of people of a 
lower socioeconomic status. A future experiment could test a larger gap between endowment 
levels to better represent the difference in income levels.  
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Appendices 
Chart 1: 
 
 
 
Average Proportion Contributed by Group 
Variable Number of Subjects 
Average 
Proportion 
Contributed 
Test Type p-value 
Endowment of 10 tokens 39 35.0% 
Paired t-test 
 0.081 
Endowment of 50 tokens 39 31.0% 
Endowment of 10 tokens without 
12th round 39 34.6% Paired t-test 
 0.098 Endowment of 50 tokens without 
12th round 39 31.1% 
Endowment of 10 tokens without 
1st or 12th round 39 34.5% Paired t-test 
 0.142 Endowment of 50 tokens without 
1st or 12th round 39 31.1% 
First game regardless of 
endowment 39 33.8% Paired t-test 
 0.481 Second game regardless of 
endowment 39 32.2% 
Endowment of 10 tokens if initial 
endowment was 10 tokens 20 34.0% Independent 
t-test 
 
0.770 
Endowment of 10 tokens if initial 
endowment was 50 tokens 19 36.1% 
Endowment of 50 tokens if initial 
endowment was 10 tokens 20 28.5% Independent 
t-test 
 
0.482 
Endowment of 50 tokens if initial 
endowment was 50 tokens 19 33.6% 
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Graph 2:
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Graph 4: 
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Research Information Sheet 
 
 
Title of Study: Public Goods with Changing Endowments 
 
Principal Investigator (PI): Madeleine Bowe   
 
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Sara Solnick 
 
Funder: University of Vermont Honors College, University of Vermont Economics 
Department, University of Vermont College of Arts and Sciences 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in this research study because you are an undergraduate 
student age 18 or older at the University of Vermont. This study is being conducted by 
Madeleine Bowe at the University of Vermont.  
 
Purpose  
The purpose of this study is to learn more about individual’s choices about contributing 
to a group.  
 
Study Procedures 
If you take part in the study, you will be asked to play a game online. You will be 
randomly assigned to a group of five players. There will be two games, each consisting 
of 12 rounds. Each player will receive 10 tokens in one game, and 50 tokens in the other 
game. Tokens are each worth $0.06. Each round, you will be asked how many tokens you 
would like to invest in a public fund, and how many you would like to keep. Each token 
in the public fund is increased in value to $0.15. All tokens in the public fund at the end 
of each round are divided equally amongst all five group members. This means that each 
player will receive $0.03 for each token in the public fund.  
 
At the end of each round, you will receive feedback about the total number of tokens 
invested by all other group members as well as your total round earnings, comprised of 
both the amount from your personal fund and the amount you received from the public 
fund. No other players will know the amount you invested. Once all players indicate that 
they are ready to move on, the next round will begin. Between the games, you will be 
notified of the change in the number of tokens you receive. The second game will 
automatically begin once all players have finished reading the instructions.  
 
The experiment should take about 45 minutes. It will require one in-person session.   
 
Benefits  
As a participant in this research study, there may not be any direct benefit for you; 
however, information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future. 
 
Risks    
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We will do our best to protect the information we collect from you during this study. 
Because we will need your name and UVM net ID to pay you, there is the risk of an 
accidental breach of confidentiality.   
 
Costs  
There will be no costs to you for participation in this research study. 
 
Compensation  
For taking part in this research study, you will be reimbursed for your time and 
inconvenience. You will receive $5 for completing the experiment. Additionally, you 
will be paid the amount from two randomly selected rounds. A 12-sided die will be rolled 
twice. The first roll will determine which round of game one is paid and the second roll 
will do the same for game two. You will be asked to sign for the payment, using your 
UVM net ID and signature. You will be given your total earnings before leaving the 
experiment location.   
 
Confidentiality 
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be stored with a 
code name or number so that we are able to match you to your answers.    
 
Your study data will be handled as confidentially as possible.  If results of this study are 
published or presented, individual names and other personally identifiable information will 
not be used. 
 
To minimize the risks to confidentiality, we will store all data using participant numbers 
instead of names. The information regarding which number has been assigned to each 
participant will not be shared with anyone other than the principle investigator and the 
faculty advisor.  
 
The sponsor(s) or their appointed designees as well as the Institutional Review Board 
and regulatory authorities will be granted direct access to your original research 
records for verification of research procedures and/or data. 
 
If your record is used or disseminated for government purposes, it will be done under 
conditions that will protect your privacy to the fullest extent possible consistent with laws 
relating to public disclosure of information and the law-enforcement responsibilities of the 
agency.   
 
Please note that email communication is neither private nor secure. Though we are taking 
precautions to protect your privacy, you should be aware that information sent through e-mail 
could be read by a third party.  
  
When the research is completed, our research team may save the study data for use in future 
research done by myself or others. We will retain this study information for at least five years 
after the study is over. The same measures described above will be taken to protect 
confidentiality of this study data.  
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Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal  
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You are free to not answer any questions or 
withdraw at any time. You may choose not to take part in this study, or if you decide to 
take part, you can change your mind later and withdraw from the study. Your data will 
have to be removed from the study. Due to logistical challenges, if you withdraw before 
the end of the experiment, we will be unable to pay you for participation.  
 
      Questions 
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact me, 
Madeleine Bowe, at the following phone number (207) 838-8289. If you have questions 
or concerns about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact the Director 
of the Research Protections Office at (802) 656-5040.  
 
Participation 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may refuse to participate without penalty or 
discrimination at any time.   
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Public Goods Experiment Instructor Script 
Checklist of materials for session: 
 
Information sheets  
Instructions (version A or B: only difference is if the first or second game uses 10 tokens) 
Receipts 
Pens 
Money 
Index cards with session names 
Answer to quiz questions 
Die 
 
 
Subject arrives: 
Please fill in this sign-in sheet. 
Give index card with session name   
Here is your session number. You will use this later. 
You’ll have to fill out some forms, do you need to borrow a pen? 
Go ahead and choose a seat, we will get started when everyone arrives.  
 
 
Ready to begin session: 
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Welcome and thank you for your interest in participating in this experiment. To begin 
with, you will have to carefully read through this information sheet.  
 
Begin passing out information sheet  
 
Please take some time now to read through the sheet and ask any questions you may have. 
Once everyone is ready, I will go into more detail regarding the process of this experiment.  
 
Answer any questions 
 
If there are no more questions, I will now hand out the instructions.  
 
Begin handing out instructions 
 
I will read these instructions aloud and then you will be asked to answer a few questions to 
guarantee that everyone understands what they will be asked to do.  
 
Read instructions 
 
This table shows an example round of the game. In this example, each player starts the 
round with 100 tokens. The value of each token is $0.06 and the public fund investments 
are increased to $0.15 before being divided between players. In terms of investments in the 
public fund, player A invested 0 tokens, player B invested 20 tokens, player C invested 65 
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tokens, player D invested 33 tokens, and player E invested 100 tokens. The value of the 
tokens remaining in the personal fund is equal to $0.06 times the number of tokens that 
were not invested in the public fund. For example, player B has $4.80 from his or her 
personal fund, because he or she kept 80 tokens each valued at $0.06. The value of tokens 
from the public fund is equal to the total number of tokens invested in the public fund 
times $0.15, divided by 5. In the table, you can see that 218 tokens were invested in the 
public fund. This gives a total of $32.70 when multiplied by $0.15. $0.15 is used instead of 
$0.06 because of the increased value of public fund tokens. This total amount of $32.70 is 
then divided by 5 to give each player an equal share. Each player gets $6.54 in this 
example. The final column shows the total value that each player earned from this round. 
This is the value from the public fund added to the value from the personal fund. So player 
A earned a total value of $12.54 from this round, player B earned $11.34, player C earned 
$8.64, player D earned $10.56, and player E earned $6.54.  
 
Are there any questions about the results in this example round? 
 
If there are no more questions, please answer the quiz questions now.  
 
Give time for participants to answer questions, check answers 
 
We will now set up the online accounts that you will use to make your game decisions. 
Please search veconlab and click on the first link. You will be registering as a participant. 
Use the session name on your card. 
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 Enter your first name and last name. You don’t need to create a password because we are 
only doing one session. The other members of your group will not see your name. Once 
everyone has entered this information, you will see the game instructions and have to 
answer two questions about the game. After that, the first round will start. If you have any 
questions regarding the setup or the use of the site, please raise your hand. Otherwise, 
please refrain from speaking with other participants during the experiment, including 
between rounds. This will help ensure that all decisions remain anonymous.  
 
Conclusion/payment: 
Thank you for completing this experiment. 
Now we will determine which rounds you will be compensated for.  
Choose closest seated participant. 
Would you roll this die twice for me? The first roll will be for the first game, and the 
second roll will be for the second game. This way everyone will be compensated for one 
round in which they got 10 tokens and one round in which they got 50 tokens. You will 
each be paid however much you earned in the two randomly selected rounds plus the $5 for 
participating. Once the rounds to be paid are determined, you will be asked to go outside 
individually to collect your payment. We will need your signature and UVM net ID at that 
time.  
 
 
  
 33 
Instructions for Public Goods Experiment 
Game Format: 
 This experiment will consist of two games, each lasting a total of 12 rounds. You will 
play both games with the same group, which will consist of four other players. Before each 
round, you will each receive a number of tokens, which are each worth $0.06. In the first game, 
you will receive 10 tokens. In the second game, you will receive 50 tokens. You will then choose 
how much to invest in the public fund and how much to keep in your personal fund. All tokens in 
your personal fund keep their original value. All tokens in the public fund will be increase in 
value to $0.15. The public fund tokens will be divided equally, so each group member will 
receive $0.03, regardless of who invested the token.  
Example: 
Player Initial 
Number of 
Tokens 
Contributed 
to Public 
Fund 
Value of 
Remaining 
Tokens in 
Personal Fund 
Value of 
Tokens 
coming from 
Public Fund 
Total Value 
A 100 0 6.00 6.54 12.54 
B 100 20 4.80 6.54 11.34 
C 100 65 2.10 6.54 8.64 
D 100 33 4.02 6.54 10.56 
E 100 100 0.00 6.54 6.54 
  Total = 218    
  Value = 
$32.70 
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Group Dynamic: 
 In each round, the number of tokens any individual player chooses to invest will remain 
anonymous. The only information the group will collectively receive will be the total amount 
invested in the public fund each round. After this information is disclosed, the next round will 
begin. You will not be able to move on to the next round until all players have indicated that they 
are ready to continue.   
 
Number of Tokens: 
You will receive 10 tokens in the first game and 50 tokens in the next game. For each 
game, you will receive the same number of tokens each round. All group members will have the 
same number of tokens in any given round.  
Each round, you will restart with your assigned number of tokens. This will not be 
affected by how many tokens you invested in the previous round. This means that any decision 
you make will only impact one round of the game. 
 Tokens will all retain the value of $0.06 throughout the entirety of the experiment.  
 
Game Operation: 
 The game will be played online. The instructor will guide you through the website setup 
and usage. There will be additional instructions and questions on this website to ensure that how 
the game is played is understood by all group members before the game begins. 
 
Payment: 
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 You will be paid based on your choice in one round of each game.  After all rounds have 
been played, one group member will roll a die twice, randomly selecting two numbers, indicating 
two of the rounds played. The first roll will determine which round will be paid from the first 
game. The second roll will determine the round from the second game to be paid.  
You will then be paid according to how much you earned in those rounds between your 
personal fund and your share of the public fund. You will additionally earn $5 just for 
completing the experiment.  
Quiz Questions: 
 In order to verify that these instructions are clear, we ask that you fill in the missing 
values in this table.  
 
Player Initial 
Number of 
Tokens 
Contributed 
to Public 
Fund 
Value of 
Remaining 
Tokens in 
Personal Fund 
Value of 
Tokens 
coming from 
Public Fund 
Total  
Value 
A 80 10 4.20   
B 80 20    
C 80 40 2.40   
D 80 50    
E 80 80 0.00   
  Total = 200    
  Value = 
$30.00 
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